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Abstract
In this commentary, we respond to Derek Ruez and Daniel Cockayne’s article ‘Feeling Otherwise:
Ambivalent Affects and the Politics of Critique in Geography’. We do so by picking up ambivalence—or
more precisely, ambivalence about ambivalence—as a tool with which Ruez and Cockayne leave us. We find
this tool somewhat difficult to grasp, but we understand this as part of its design. Ambivalence undoes the
subject’s mastery. In doing so, we find that an airing of ambivalence gives other kinds of entangled, indeterminate, and unknowing relations room to breathe.
Keywords
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In this response, we take up Ruez and Cockayne’s
(2021) call to spend time with ambivalence, a concept that they set up as an inherently embodied
orientation towards producing concepts and a pathway to ‘pluralize the moods and modes of geographic scholarship’. Picking up ambivalence as
a tool, we expect that it will deliver us to a frustrating place of work and little forward movement. But
then, maybe we have had enough ‘forward movement’ for the moment—bound up as this prerogative is with modern colonial and capitalist notions
of time, progress, and productivity. Perhaps
ambivalence, which seems unlikely to power anyone forward into anything, will be a different kind
of tool, one that might help to pry open an impassive place for relational transformation and intraactivity rather than progressive propulsion. This is
our experiment.

Ruez and Cockayne make an offering to the
reader. It is an offering that seems designed to slip
through one’s fingers. After wending our way
through the interconnected burrows of affirmation,
reparation, minor theory, and pluralism, we arrive
at this statement in the final paragraph of their
article: ‘We would like, then, to leave this ambivalence about ambivalence with the reader, as something worth continuing to think about and working
with, but not necessarily resolving or working
through’. In keeping with the ethos of their text,
they have offered us something to work with but
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not to work through. And this thing to work with—
this tool—is not ambivalence per se but rather
ambivalence about ambivalence. This hedging is
by design, for by the time we have arrived at this
conclusion, Ruez and Cockayne have made it clear
that any prescription of proper affects or orientations for critique stumbles and breaks down in a
plural and uneven world. It is therefore a fitting
enactment of their argument to eschew the scholarly discourse of mastery by leaving the reader not
with an argument ‘for ambivalence’ but with something as seemingly insubstantial as ‘ambivalence
about ambivalence’.
It is difficult, and certainly against the grain, to
abjure mastery in scholarly discourse. Even minoritarian scholarship engages in masterful practices.
In Unthinking Mastery, Singh’s critical readings of
postcolonial texts show how projects of undoing
colonial mastery have ‘employed mastery as a concept and practice that was vital to the emergence of a
fully decolonized subject’ (2018: 24). If the master’s main tool is mastery, it is perhaps time that
we learn how to lay it down. To put Ruez and Cockayne’s argument in this light, whether the demand is
for objective, critical (paranoid), affirmative,
reparative, or even ambivalent relations to (scholarly) objects, making this demand is itself a masterful practice: that is, a practice that ‘invariably and
relentlessly reaches toward the indiscriminate control over something—whether human or inhuman,
animate or inanimate’ by ‘estranging the mastered
object from its previous state of being’ (Singh,
2017: 10). To leave us with ambivalence about
ambivalence rather than with a prescription for
ambivalence is thus, in Halberstram’s words, to
‘resist mastery’ by insisting upon counterintuitive
ways of (un)knowing (2011: 11–12).
We confess to being ambivalent about this
ambivalence about ambivalence with which we are
left. How does a tool that itself resists self-identity
even work? How does it become ready-to-hand
without any fixing of meaning or function? Can
we use it without stopping it from slipping away—
a tool of unmastery? Perhaps one way to stay with
the spirit of ‘working with’ rather than ‘working
through’ is to play with ambivalence as polyvalent,
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as a concept that itself is conflicted and has multiple
stories to tell.
For one thing, ambivalence has a story to tell
about the role it was recruited for in the Freudian
psychic drama. Becoming increasingly important
in Freud’s theory and practice over the course of
his work, ambivalence in a psychoanalytic register
refers to a situation where ‘positive and negative
components of the emotional attitude are simultaneously in evidence and inseparable, and where
they constitute a non-dialectical opposition which
the subject, saying “yes” and “no” at the same time,
is incapable of transcending’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973: 28). This dynamic was, for Freud, at the
heart of the Oedipal conflict, conceived as a ‘conflict of ambivalence’ marked by the co-presence of
‘a well-grounded love and a no less justifiable
hatred towards one and the same person’ (Freud,
1926: 102; quoted in Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973:
28). Fueling such torments as guilt-ridden mourning and destructive jealousy, this affective ambivalence is not something the subject wants to know
about. Intolerable, irresolvable, and repressed,
ambivalence comes to hand here as a passion that
does not coincide with itself and that cannot solve
its own riddle. This story of ambivalence is one in
which its volatile admixture burns a hole in the
fabric of subjective coherence.
But this is just one of many stories in which
ambivalence plays a role. Colloquially, the meaning of ambivalence has a slippery tendency
towards indifference: a non-relation. Take, for
example, the statement ‘She’s ambivalent about
my suggestion to get ice cream’. Does she not like
ice cream and thus feel disinterested in the plan
(indifference), or does she love ice cream and
detest the idea of my company (ambivalence)?
Ambivalence often reads colloquially as a lack of
feeling towards a given object. But this impression
shrouds an internal dilemma in an aura of detachment, disinterest, or restraint. An ambivalent subject caught in the rapture of indecision therefore
finds her space/time of internal battle collapsed
into a presumption of un-relation. In Deleuzian
terms, indifference could be understood as the
effect of a collapsed plateau, wherein the poles
(e.g love/hate) can no longer hold the balance of
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intensity, and the space of divergent passions
formed between them flattens into a limp pile, easily read as a lack of passion, interest, or life.
The collapsing, conflicted spacetime of ambivalence is akin to a state of quantum superposition. That
is, ambivalence refers to a system existing in several
separate states at the same time—spinning up and
spinning down, heads and tails, loving and hating,
passionate and indifferent. As such, the quantum system is ontologically indeterminate, having no definite
values until it is measured, at which point the entanglement actualizes as a determinate property (Barad,
2007). It is only upon ‘measurement’—that is,
through alignment to a system of legibility and mastery—that the uncertain, un-dichotomized ontology
of ambivalence appears to resolve into a single affective ‘truth’ and corresponding action, a going towards
or pulling away. Ruez and Cockayne are urging us to
‘stay with the trouble’ of indeterminacy, to linger in
the ambivalence of entanglement and superposition
without picking up our instruments of measurement
and mastery.
It is therefore important to understand that the
ambivalence of our ambivalence about ambivalence
(with which Ruez and Cockayne have left us) is not
indifference, this being but one way in which
ambivalence becomes overwritten, its indeterminacy
resolved into a specific state. Although indifference
might sound like a lackluster state, it is not neutral or
passive but rather an active over-coding of the roiling
messiness of ambivalence. In the scientific realm,
indifference is bound up with a general esteem for
‘detached enterprise, impartial and impersonal’
(Livingstone, 2003: 185). Such airs of dispassion
impose ‘clarity on ambiguity’, upholding the idea
that science should be ‘disembodied above the messiness of human affairs’ (Livingstone, 2003: 179).
Hand in hand with imperial practices of science,
indifference is weaponized as a tool of colonial
bureaucracy. Expressed as responsibility and ‘impersonal power’, it serves as a pillar in the fortress that
excludes ‘undifferentiated outsiders’ from compassion and care (Herzfeld, 1993: 122, 79). Indifference
as ‘a poetics of colonial institutions’ disguises plurality as a monolith (Rukmini, 2002: xiv, 226).
Ruez and Cockayne demonstrate that the messiness of unresolved ambivalence is fundamental to
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the kind of critique that they envision: a sweaty one.
As Sara Ahmed puts it, ‘we have been taught to tidy
our texts, not to reveal the struggle we have in getting somewhere’ (2017: 13). Ambivalence in critique urges us to focus not on the outcome but on
the struggle in the encounter between researcher and
object. It is in essence a call to relationality: to generate ‘sweaty concepts’ rather than polished ones
(Ahmed, 2017). This is a hazardous proposal
because it threatens to expose to the outside the
internal feelings, thoughts, and experiences of the
subject in the encounter with an object. This is vulnerable, and vulnerability is scary. Vulnerability is
exposing. It is disqualifying, unprofessional. Vulnerability situates, particularizes, and conditions.
Vulnerability is quite opposite to mastery.
To work in ambivalent relation to an object means
to keep open the invitation of divergent pulls.
Accepting the offer of ambivalence may be quite
uncomfortable, an invitation to the underside of our
affective attachments that we would rather not know
about. Exploring what is intolerable and unknown
means seeking out what we cannot already see, what
we may not even believe exists, and exposing this
unpleasant nonsense to the eyes of others. This
sounds like a whole mess. And it will not get us anywhere. Yet is this not the way of a real engagement
with difference, in the sense that Ruez and Cockayne
use the term? To be left with ambivalence in relation
to an object is to be left feeling multiplicities about it.
It is not to feel autonomy in the face of this other, but
to relate to it in multiple manners—maybe even
sometimes by way of mastery, but never only this.
To remain in an ambivalent relation is to give in to an
entanglement with an object, recognizing that it may
not be repairable, conclusive, or safe. You risk falling
prey to your ambivalent entanglement.
What can ambivalence do? Such an ambivalent
orientation between subject and object is inconclusive. Like Ruez and Cockayne’s text, ambivalence
moves us forward by not moving us beyond a problem, but holding us in intimate relation to it. Sustaining ambivalence concedes sovereignty to
complexity. We relinquish mastery in the face of
something greater: the entanglement and indeterminacy of the object and of our own affective state.
Ruez and Cockayne do not argue that ambivalence
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is the only proper orientation towards a complex
object. Rather, they demonstrate that an ambivalent orientation is one that is elbow deep in the
disconcerting irresolvability of complexity. Other
orientations are, of course, on the table, and imply
other relationships to the object. But being left
(however ambivalently) with ambivalence towards
ambivalence frames the question of critique one
step back: as one of how we are to relate to an
object and where sovereignty should lie. This,
then, is how we experience the capacities of the
tool we find slipping through our hands.
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